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Abstract
The paper investigates the trade-off between innovation and defence industrial policy. It presents 
an agent-based simulation model calibrated for the Norwegian defence industry that compares 
different policy scenarios and examines the effects of a pending EU market liberalization process. 
The paper points to two main results. (1) It finds that a pure scenario where national authorities 
focus on, and provide support exclusively for, either a) international competitiveness or b) natio-
nal defence and security objectives, is more Pareto efficient than a corresponding mixed strategy 
where policy makers simultaneously pursue both international competitiveness and defence and 
security objectives. (2) Under the conditions of the new EU liberalization regime, it finds that a 
stronger and more visible trade-off will emerge between international competitiveness and natio-
nal defence and security objectives. Policy makers will have to choose which to prioritise, and set 
a clear agenda focusing on one of the two objectives.
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A Simulation Model Analysis of 
the Norwegian Defence Industry 

1. Introduction 
The European Union’s Defence and Security Procurement Directive 
(2009/81/EC) will during 2011 and 2012 be transposed into national 
law by EU (European Union) and EFTA (European Free Trade Asso-
ciation) Member States. The intention behind the Directive is to en-
sure free trade of defence and security equipment within the European 
Economic Area (EEC) and thereby increase competition, reduce du-
plication, lower prices and eventually strengthen the international 
competitiveness of the European defence sector. Although the actual 
impact of the Directive is still uncertain, it is likely that many Member 
States will find it more difficult to maintain protectionist policies such 
as national favouritism and offset (counter-trade) requirements. Nev-
ertheless, the Directive might not affect each member country in the 
same way or to the same extent. Some authors have already begun to 
speculate that the Directive will impact member countries differently 
according to the size of their national defence markets and the 
strengths of their defence industrial base [
1
]. One concern, in this re-
gard, is that a higher degree of market liberalization in the European 
defence market might lead to rationalization of production and lower 
costs of defence equipment for the EU as a whole, but that smaller 
Member States, such as Norway, might find that these benefits are 
offset by the impediments that the Directive creates with respect to 
achieving other important policy goals. 
 
Norway has traditionally sought to foster a strong domestic defence 
industry because it considered this sector vital for reaching two dis-
tinct types of policy objectives. On the one hand, national authorities 
have provided innovation policy support to the domestic defence in-
dustry because they believed that defence companies could foster eco-
nomic growth and international competitiveness by introducing tech-
nologically advanced innovations and generating strong positive spill-
over effects to related domestic industries. On the other hand, public 
authorities have also supported the domestic defence industry through 
traditional defence industrial policies because they believed that de-
fence companies could provide the armed forces with access to high-
end technological expertise and ensure that the country had a steady 
supply of spare parts and munitions in times of a national crisis. The 
Norwegian Government has pursued these two policy objectives 
through two different types of policy instruments: (1) innovation poli-
cies that encourage the introduction of specialized products and com-
ponents based on high-end technological expertise; and (2) defence 
industrial policies that encourage the introduction of complex weapon 
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systems and platforms based on integration of a broad base of tech-
nologies. The former has significantly sustained the economic perfor-
mance and international competitiveness of so-called specialized sup-
plier companies [
2
], whereas the latter has fostered technological and 
military capabilities of the largest firms in the Norwegian defence sec-
tor, which are those that can play the role of system integrators. 
 
This policy background leads to formulate some important questions. 
How do these two distinct policy goals affect one another, is there a 
trade-off and contrast between them? Relatedly, how will the intro-
duction of the new EU directive affect these two policy objectives and 
the relationship, or trade-off, between them? Motivated by these two 
research questions, the present article intends to: 
 
i. Investigate the trade-off and contrasting effects of two differ-
ent policy objectives in the defence industry: strengthening 
military capabilities through defence industrial policy versus 
fostering the companies’ international competitiveness through 
innovation policy. 
ii. Examine whether and the extent to which a greater degree of 
market liberalization in the future, as a consequence of the im-
plementation of the new EU Directive, will affect this trade-
off. 
 
To investigate these research issues, the article will set up and analyse 
an agent-based model of the defence industry, which will simulate the 
dynamics of the Norwegian defence industry under different policy 
scenarios. The model is based on and extends the so-called SKIN 
model (Simulating Knowledge Dynamics in Innovation Networks), 
which provides an analysis of private firms’ interactions and 
knowledge dynamics in high-tech industries, developed in a number 
of recent articles by Gilbert et alia, Pyka et alia and Ahrweiller et alia 
[
3
,
4
,
5
]. Our approach is rooted in these recent models, but extends 
them further by applying it to the relationship between international 
competitiveness and military capabilities within a context of increas-
ing market liberalization in the defence sector.  
 
The simulation analysis carried out in this article looks at the effect of 
three different policy strategies – “pure” innovation policy,’ “pure” 
defence industrial policy’ & “mixed” innovation and defence industri-
al policy. Each of these is analysed under two different institutional 
regimes – before and after the introduction of the new EU Directive. 
The simulation analysis points out three main results: (1) There is a 
clear trade-off between pure innovation and pure defence industrial 
policies – pursing innovation policies will improve international com-
petitiveness of the firms at the expense of their military capabilities, 
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and vice versa. (2) Pursuing a mixed strategy – of combining innova-
tion and defence industrial policy support – strengthens the firms’ mil-
itary capabilities slightly more than pure defence industrial policies, 
but at the cost of a severe decline in their international competitive-
ness. (3) These trade-offs are maintained even after the introduction of 
the new EU Directive, but the international competitiveness of the 
firms increases significantly for all policy scenarios. Based on these 
findings, the article points out that national authorities should consider 
abandoning “mixed” policy strategies and instead pursue “pure” poli-
cy strategies that focus on only one of the objectives. It also points out 
that increasing liberalization might constitute more of an opportunity 
than a threat for the Norwegian defence industry, but that national au-
thorities need to consider carefully what their most important policy 
goal is – strengthening the military capabilities of their firms or their 
international competitiveness. 
 
Although the main topic of the paper is the trade-off between innova-
tion and defence industrial policies, the insights gained through the 
analysis might be relevant for other sectors of the economy as well. 
We believe that the findings in this paper can be especially useful for 
understanding industries where there is a dynamic, complex and con-
flicting relationship between economically efficient production and 
important social externalities. In food production, for instance, some 
farming methods help maintain the cultural landscape and contribute 
to tourism and sustainable development, but they are not necessarily 
the most efficient; and in energy production, some means of energy 
production are less efficient, but they are more reliable and contribute 
to a higher level of energy security. We believe that this article may 
provide insights that can be valid for these and other sectors of the 
economy. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides back-
ground information on the Norwegian defence industry and policy re-
gimes and points out some facts that the model seeks to reproduce; 
section 3 presents the model; section 4 defines the firm level and in-
dustry-level variables used in the simulation analysis; section 5 pre-
sents the main outcomes of the model and discusses some alternative 
policy scenarios; and section 6 concludes by summarizing the key re-
sults and implications of the work.  
 
   
 
2. Background: innovation and  
defence industrial policy in Norway 
The Norwegian defence industry consists of a population of around 
120 fairly heterogeneous companies [
6
]. A limited number of large 
multi-product and multi-competence companies are the strongest 
players in the defence market and can be described as systems integra-
tors in sense that they deliver complete weapon systems or platforms. 
The rest of the companies in the Norwegian market are instead small 
or medium-sized (or larger civilian companies with a small military 
business on the side), and can be described as specialized suppliers, in 
the sense that they produce either specialized components (e.g. for 
weapon systems) or “simple,” stand-alone military equipment. Alt-
hough the Norwegian defence industry is small compared to the de-
fence industries in other European countries, it has a wide span of 
technological competencies and a broad portfolio of products – pro-
ducing everything from tactical communications and crypto solution 
to ammunitions and military explosives, from tents and protective 
suits to components for aircrafts, vehicles, vessels and submarines. 
The Norwegian defence contractors are also as a whole very export 
intensive compared to most other defence firms in Europe [
7
]. Alt-
hough, there are great variations from company to company, Norwe-
gian defence firms receive on average about half of their revenues 
from foreign clients. Both this breadth of competence and the high 
export intensity are not only a result of market dynamics, but to a 
large extent also the consequence of policies that have been in place 
since the early post WW2 period.  
 
Norwegian policies toward its domestic defence industry have been 
greatly influenced by its post-WW2 reconstruction efforts and the 
country’s ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty [8] (the founding 
document of the NATO alliance). Unlike its neighbour Sweden – 
which pursued a policy of neutrality and needed to be self-sufficient in 
terms of defence equipment – Norway could through its membership 
in NATO depend on other member countries for access to defence 
material. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Government wanted to ensure 
that its armed forces had a secure supply of spare parts and munitions 
and began in the first post war decades to support the build-up of a 
Norwegian defence industry that could support its armed forces with 
critical capabilities and components. The Norwegian Government 
found another reason to support its domestic defence industry in the 
1970s. Norway was devastated during WW2 and began in the early 
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post war decades an ambitious program of reconstruction. The Nor-
wegian Government believed initially that supporting the development 
of a domestic defence industry could take resources away from its re-
construction efforts, but changed its mind during the 1970s when it 
realized that production of sophisticated military products could help 
modernized its industry and that exporting defence equipment could 
provide the country with much needed foreign currency. These two 
policy goals – strengthening military capabilities and fostering inter-
national competitiveness – were typically pursued by two different 
types of policies, defence industrial policy and innovation policy re-
spectively, and have since the early post war years served as beacons 
for the Norwegian policy development vis-à-vis its domestic defence 
industry. 
 
Two of the most important institutions shaping the innovation and de-
fence industrial policy landscape in Norway today are Innovation 
Norway (IN) and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD). Both IN 
and the MoD have been tasked by the Government with promoting a 
strong and viable defence industry in Norway, but for different rea-
sons and through different means. IN has been given the responsibility 
for the innovation policy and support defence companies that can 
stimulate economic growth by generating positive spill-over effects 
and opening up new export markets. It supports the defence industry 
through a wide variety of innovation and internationalization-related 
support programs, directed primarily towards small and medium sized 
(specialized suppliers) companies. The Norwegian MoD, on the other 
hand, has been given the responsibility for the defence industrial poli-
cy and support defence companies that can provide the armed forces 
with access to the high-end technological expertise that it needs when 
it acquires new military equipment and ensure that it has a steady sup-
ply of spare parts and munitions in times of a national crisis. It sup-
ports the defence industry primarily through acquisition-related R&D 
support programs and export-stimulating offset agreements, which 
often benefit companies with a broad technological competency base.  
 
Although both IN and the Norwegian MoD are tasked with promoting 
a strong and viable defence industry, it is an open question whether 
their policy goals are compatible or whether their policy instruments 
support one another. The companies that the Norwegian MoD sup-
ports are those that have capabilities that are useful in a military con-
text, while the companies that IN promotes are those that have specific 
expertise that is useful in terms of e.g. foreign commercialization and 
export activities. These two spheres are often in sharp contrast with 
each other. However, few studies have discussed the possible contrast 
between innovation and defence industrial policy. Martin, Brauer and 
Dunne have investigated the economic effects of offset (counter-trade) 
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agreements and found that they tend to increase the cost of military 
equipment, while promoting economic growth only marginally [
9
,
10
]. 
Apostolakis has found that trade-barriers on defence equipment (Buy 
American Act) can have detrimental effects on the cost and quality of 
defence equipment [
11
]. Nevertheless, none of these previous studies 
have systematically compared the costs and benefits of focusing on 
military capability building versus fostering innovation and the inter-
national competitiveness of defence companies.    
 
It is still an open question to what extent EU and EFTA Member 
States will still be able to make use of defence industrial policies after 
the European Union’s Defence and Security Procurement Directive 
(2009/81/EC) will have been transposed into national law. The inten-
tion behind the Directive is to ensure free trade of defence and securi-
ty equipment within the European Economic Area, and it is likely that 
many Member States will find it more difficult to maintain protection-
ist policies such as national favouritism and offset (counter-trade) re-
quirements. Nevertheless, the Directive opens up for the use of many 
other policy instruments, such as R&D support to domestic companies 
(up to a certain technological maturity level) and direct purchase 
without competition from national industries if their products have 
been developed as part of an international joint ventures involving a 
considerable amount of R&D [
12
]. For the Norwegian defence contrac-
tors this implies that they might find it somewhat easier to sell their 
products to other European countries, but at the same time they will 
face increased competition both in foreign and domestic markets. For 
the Norwegian Government, this implies that it can, at least to some 
extent, continue to support its domestic industry, although national 
defence authorities will have to rethink the rationale and appropriate 
mix of the policy objectives they pursue and the policy instruments 
they adopt.   
 
3.  The model 
Agent-based models and simulations (ABMS) provide a framework to 
analyse a set of heterogeneous agents and the interactions among them 
[
13
,
14
,
15
]. A specific model of our interest is the so-called SKIN model 
(Simulating Knowledge Dynamics in Innovation Networks), intro-
duced in a number of recent papers by Gilbert et alia, Pyka et alia and 
Ahrweiller et alia [
16
,
17
,
18
,
19
]. This is an agent-based model that pro-
vides an accurate analysis of private firms’ interactions and 
knowledge dynamics in high-tech (or knowledge intensive) industries. 
Our paper is rooted in this recent model and extends it further by ap-
plying it to the study of the defence sector. While the main description 
of the model follows the main basic pillars of the SKIN approach, our 
model departs from it in some important ways. Figure 1 presents a di-
agram describing the behaviour of agents (private firms) and their 
market interactions within any given period t. 
3.1  Defence firms 
Defence firms (business companies producing defence material, 
equipment and products) are the micro agents in the model. Agents 
differ from each other in two main respects (firm heterogeneity). First, 
they have different initial endowments of financial capital, which they 
use both for their productive and innovative activities. Large firms co-
exist with SMEs in the defence market. Secondly, they differ in terms 
of their knowledge base, i.e. the pool of scientific and technological 
competencies and skills that the company employs in its innovative 
activities. The model represents the firm’s knowledge base as a set of 
units of knowledge. Each unit is a vector composed of three elements 
(or triple):  
 
 The capability (C), which defines a domain or area within the 
defence industry (e.g. weapon production). It is represented in 
the model as a randomly chosen integer between 1 and 1000. 
 The ability (A), defining a specific ability or skill that the firm 
possesses in this C domain (e.g aerodynamic design technolo-
gies for platforms and weapons). It is a randomly chosen inte-
ger between 1 and 10. 
 The expertise (E), which indicates the level of expertise that 
the firm has in using the ability A. This is also represented as a 
randomly chosen number between 1 (lowest) and 10 (highest).
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Figure 1: Model flowchart 
 
 
Defence firms compete in a highly innovative and technologically so-
phisticated environment (see section 2). Our model assumes that all 
firms in the market actively use their knowledge base in the attempt to 
create new products and processes. Innovative activities are represent-
ed in the SKIN model in such a way that, at any period t, each compa-
ny formulates an innovation hypothesis, i.e. an idea or a plan for de-
veloping a new product or process. The model represents this innova-
tion hypothesis (IH) as a subset of the firm’s knowledge base, i.e. the 
enterprise focuses on a specific subset of its technological competence 
(capabilities, abilities, expertise) that it finds particularly promising 
and worth developing further. The subset of expertise (Ei) used in the 
innovation hypothesis are assumed to increase by one unit in the peri-
od, whereas those that are not used decrease by one unit (learning by 
doing and forgetting mechanisms). 
3.2  The defence market 
In any period t, each enterprise uses its innovation hypothesis to try to 
develop a new product. The outcomes of the innovative process are 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty and introduce an important sto-
chastic element in the model. The new product is characterized as an 
index number that depends on the number of capabilities and abilities 
entailed in the innovation hypothesis according to the function: 
 
P = (∑ Ci ∙ Ai) mod N                                                                    (1) 
 
where N is the maximum number of different products. The product is 
therefore characterized by the breadth of the innovation hypothesis, 
i.e. the number of different capabilities and abilities that the firm mas-
ters and it is able to combine in the development of the new artefact.  
By contrast, the quality of the product depends on the depth of the in-
novation hypothesis, i.e. it is a function of the enterprise’s specific 
abilities and expertise. Specifically, product quality is defined as an 
index number obtained by multiplying the abilities and expertise lev-
els for each of the vectors composing the innovation hypothesis and 
then normalizing the result. In other words, the key characteristic and 
value added of a new product does not depend on how broad the 
firm’s technological competence is, but rather how deep and special-
ized the company is in a specific sub-set or market niche. As ex-
plained below, this trade-off between competence breadth versus 
depth is an important characteristic driving the model’s outcomes. 
 
In order to produce the new product, the firm searches for inputs (e.g. 
capital equipment) in the market. The type of input it needs depends 
on the characteristics of the product it wants to develop (P), and it 
eventually purchases the one with the lowest price and, ceteris pari-
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bus, the highest quality. If the enterprise does not find any input in the 
market at a price it can afford, it will not enter the production process. 
Once the product is ready for market commercialization, the firm sets 
its price by applying a mark-up (profit margin) over the total costs. 
Depending on the market demand available for this product, an ad-
justment mechanism tends to increase (decrease) its price over time if 
the demand level is high (low). More specifically, the model assumes 
that demand patterns differ for different segments of the defence in-
dustry. On the one hand, intermediate products are sold to other firms 
within the defence sector and their price is subject to the adjustment 
mechanism noted above. On the other hand, new products that are 
destined to the end users are always absorbed by the market. This as-
sumption is in line with the fact that, in the defence industry, public 
procurement assumes a pivotal role, i.e. defence authorities typically 
purchase a substantial amount of new (or existing) defence products 
and material from domestic firms in order to secure military capabili-
ties and so achieve national defence strategic objectives.  
 
Given these market interactions and outcomes, at any period t the firm 
achieves a certain level of profit – which is largely dependent on the 
characteristics and quality of the new product it sells.  
 
We further assume that if the enterprise’s profits are large enough to 
cover sunk export costs (i.e. above a given profit threshold), then the 
enterprise is able to start the commercialization of its product also to 
foreign markets. This is in line with the key idea of the recent litera-
ture on firm heterogeneity and international trade [
20
,
21
], according to 
which only the most successful and productive enterprises within each 
sector are able to pay sunk export costs and overcome trade barriers in 
international markets, whereas most other companies will only pro-
duce for the domestic market. 
3.3 Performance adjustment and feedback loops 
After having produced and commercialized its product, the firm looks 
at its current market performance (i.e. the profits it has realized at time 
t), and decides whether this is satisfactory or not, and how it can be 
improved in the future. The model’s parameter success threshold (de-
fined in further details in section 4) indicates the profit level that 
marks the distinction between successful versus unsuccessful perfor-
mance. This parameter is exogenously set at a given level for all firms 
in the market. For simplicity, we start by assuming that this success 
threshold corresponds to the mean profit level in the industry: enter-
prises whose profits are above (below) the industry-level mean will be 
satisfied (not satisfied) with their current performance. There are two 
ways in which an enterprise can improve its performance over time. 
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One can only be pursued by unsuccessful performers, whereas the 
other is followed by successful innovators.  
 
New privately-funded R&D projects and cooperation: If a firm is 
not satisfied with the profits it has realized, it will try to improve its 
performance by starting to search in a new direction [
22
]. An enterprise 
can apply two different search strategies to adjust its performance. (1) 
If its current product was sold in the market but the demand level was 
not sufficient to realize a satisfactory profit level, the company will 
undertake a new R&D project funded through its own internal re-
sources (financial capital). The new R&D project will aim at improv-
ing one of the abilities (A) in its innovation hypothesis – or, put it dif-
ferently, to achieve a better specialization and technological sophisti-
cation in the technological space on which it is currently focusing (i.e. 
an increased technological depth, given its current breadth). 
 
(2) By contrast, if the firm’s current product did not meet any demand 
in the market (hence leading to negative profits), this gives a clear in-
dication that the firm’s current innovation hypothesis is not well suited 
to the user requirements, and that it must be adjusted. The enterprise 
can do this by searching for an external partner for cooperation. The 
firm will first search among its previous partners, then its suppliers 
and users, by looking at the capability sets they possess as indicated 
by their respective innovation hypotheses and market product charac-
teristics. When a firm finds a collaboration partner, it can add the 
partner’s innovation hypothesis triples to its own, thus achieving a 
broadening up of its capability set and knowledge base. Put it differ-
ently, cooperation enables the exchange of knowledge among differ-
ent agents, and this is likely to improve the performance of these by 
augmenting their respective knowledge bases and technological com-
petencies. All in all, the two strategies pursued by unsuccessful per-
formers – privately-funded R&D and cooperation – introduce in the 
model a catch up mechanism, since firms lagging behind the techno-
logical frontier may improve their technological position and adjust 
their market performance by means of such R&D and imitation strate-
gies. 
 
Public funding and policy objectives: If a firm is satisfied with the 
profits it has realized, it may decide to apply for public funding for 
improving its product further (publicly-funded incremental innova-
tion). Public defence authorities typically finance a substantial amount 
of domestic R&D activities through public procurement, as noted in 
section 2. We assume that this public funding is granted to the appli-
cant according to two different criteria: (1) The quality of the firm’s 
product has to be above a given product quality threshold; (2) The 
firm’s technological and competence breadth (i.e. the number of capa-
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bilities C in its innovation hypothesis) has to be above a given compe-
tence breadth threshold. The intuition behind this public funding allo-
cation mechanism is in line with the practice that public defence au-
thorities typically follow. Put it simply, when policy-makers evaluate 
the possibility to finance a company to develop a new product, they 
look at two different aspects:  
 
(1) The quality of its current product, which gives them an indication 
of the likelihood that the firm will be able to produce a successful in-
cremental innovation of it in the future. This is the key dimension that 
policy-makers want to foster in order to promote the export perfor-
mance and international competitiveness of domestic enterprises.  
 
(2) The breadth of the firm’s expertise in several different areas, since 
large multi-product and multi-competence enterprises are those that 
have presumably received public funding already in the past and thus 
previously developed a reliable user-producer relationship with public 
authorities. This is the aspect that defence authorities look at when 
they want to finance large enterprises to build up and strengthen tech-
nological and military capabilities for national security objectives. 
 
The existence of these two different policy objectives, and the related 
public funding allocation mechanisms, is as noted above the main 
point investigated by the model. The current institutional set up in the 
defence industry typically combines together these two public funding 
criteria, so that companies may qualify for public funding either if 
they have a high product quality or if they have a broad competence 
basis (or both). The next section will ask whether the current “mixed” 
scenario is better and more efficient than the corresponding alternative 
“pure” scenarios, in which firms may only receive public funding for 
one of these two allocation criteria. 
 
A summary and overview of the model (see figure 1) highlights the 
following two key features of this theoretical framework. First, in any 
period t, the agents will be sorted in three distinct groups: (1) success-
ful innovators that qualify for public funding (see figure 1, loop 1); (2) 
successful innovators that do not meet the criteria for public support 
(loop 2); (3) unsuccessful performers, which will either undertake a 
new privately-funded R&D project or imitate by searching a coopera-
tion partner (loop 3). Secondly, the overall dynamics of the model, as 
shown in the next section, depends on the combination of two differ-
ent mechanisms: (1) a cumulative causation mechanism according to 
which the best performers will tend to get public support and hence 
strengthen their market position even further in the future; (2) a catch 
up mechanism through which less successful companies will be able 
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to adjust their performance and possibly achieve a leading market po-
sition in the future. 
 
4. Variables and indicators 
4.1  Target (dependent) variables: Industry-level outcomes 
The following four variables are aggregate outcomes of the model, i.e. 
emergent properties that are observed at the industry-level as the result 
of micro-level behaviour and agents’ interactions. They represent the 
key variables defining the performance of the defence industry, and 
thus the main factors we seek to explain in our simulation analysis. 
The first three variables refer to the policy objective export perfor-
mance and international competitiveness (the main objective of inno-
vation policy), while the fourth indicator refers to the policy objective 
military capabilities and national security (the main objective of de-
fence industrial policy). 
 
Export propensity (%): Number of exporters as a share of the total 
number of firms in the industry. This is the variable typically high-
lighted by recent models of firm heterogeneity and international trade 
[
23
,
24
]. As explained in the previous section, only firms that are above 
a given profitability level are assumed to be able to cover sunk export 
costs and export their products in foreign markets, whereas most other 
enterprises will continue to produce only for the domestic market. 
This variable is typically used as an indicator of the export perfor-
mance of an industry for a given country. 
 
Export value: A second commonly used indicator of the export per-
formance of an industry is the total value of export in the industry, 
which is obtained as the sum of all defence firms’ export value in any 
given period t. 
 
Mean product quality: A third indicator of industry competitiveness 
is provided by the mean product quality in the defence sector, calcu-
lated as the industry-level average of the index measuring each de-
fence firm’s product quality. The reason for using this indicator has 
been explained in section 3: our model assumes that the export per-
formance of an enterprise depends on the quality of the product it 
commercializes. So, there is a close correspondence in our model be-
tween the mean product quality and the industry’s international com-
petitiveness. 
 
Mean competence breadth: This is the industry-level average of the 
competence breadth of all firms in the defence market. We use this as 
an indicator of the second main policy objective investigated in this 
paper (military capabilities and national security). As explained 
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above, the rationale for choosing this indicator is that national defence 
authorities – in the attempt to strengthen the military capabilities they 
need for security reasons – typically provide financial support to de-
fence companies with a broad base of competencies, since these com-
panies are most likely to be able to provide the armed forces with ac-
cess to the high-end technological expertise that it needs when it ac-
quires new military equipment and support them with a steady supply 
of spare parts and munitions in times of a national crisis. In sum, a 
higher average competence breadth in the industry means that there is 
a large enough pool of capabilities and expertise that national defence 
authorities may exploit to achieve their military capabilities and na-
tional security objective. 
4.2  Key explanatory variables (policy strategies and  
objectives) 
The following two parameters describe the key characteristics of the 
policy environment in which agents operate, which are determined by 
the policy strategies and objectives pursued by policy makers. They 
represent the main explanatory variables of interest in our simulation 
analysis. Our policy scenarios will be constructed by exploring differ-
ent combinations and configurations of these two parameters. 
 
Public funding criterion I: Product quality threshold: This is the 
first of the two criteria set by public authorities to grant public support 
to private defence firms. The indicator ranges on a continuous scale 
defined on the quality domain between 0 (loose quality requirement, 
easy to get public funding) to 10 (strict quality requirement, difficult 
to get public support). 
 
Public funding criterion II: Competence breadth threshold: This is 
the second requirement for qualifying for public support. The parame-
ter ranges on a continuous scale defined on the innovation hypothesis 
domain between 0 (narrow technological competence, easy to get pub-
lic funding for most firms) to 10 (broad technological competence, 
difficult to get public support for many narrowly specialized compa-
nies). 
4.3  Other explanatory variables (control factors)  
The remaining six parameters do also represent environmental charac-
teristics affecting the industry dynamics and model outcomes. How-
ever, they may not be influenced by policy actions in the short-run, so 
we regard them as control factors and take them as exogenous in our 
simulation analysis. 
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Cooperation propensity: This defines the extent to which agents are 
willing (and able) to cooperate with others in the same market, i.e. 
their collaboration propensity. This parameter ranges on a continuous 
scale from 0,50 (lowest cooperation propensity) to 0 (highest propen-
sity). 
 
Success threshold: This indicates the threshold above (below) which 
firms consider themselves satisfied (not satisfied) with their current 
market performance (e.g. corresponding to the mean profit level in the 
industry). The parameter is defined in the profit space ranging from 0 
to 12 000. This parameter is largely dependent on the extent and in-
tensity of market competition, i.e. the success threshold is higher 
(lower) in a more (less) open and competitive market, because agents 
must compete with a greater (smaller) number of competitors (includ-
ing foreign firms) in order to maintain their market position. In other 
words, in a more (less) open and competitive market companies tend 
to be more (less) demanding because they are aware they face a 
stronger (weaker) competition.  
 
Number of firms: Total number of enterprises in the market. 
 
Number of products: Total number of products that are sold in the 
market. 
 
Share of large firms: Number of large enterprises as a percentage of 
the total number of firms in the market. 
 
Share of end products firms: Number of enterprises that produce 
final products as a percentage of the total number of firms in the in-
dustry.  
5. Simulation analysis and results 
5.1 Six different policy scenarios 
The six policy scenarios we construct differ in terms of two main as-
pects. First, they differ in terms of the policy strategy adopted by na-
tional authorities to finance and support private firms in the defence 
industry. The “mixed” scenarios are those resembling the current insti-
tutional set up, in which policy makers simultaneously pursue two dif-
ferent objectives – fostering international competitiveness (through 
innovation policy) and strengthening military capabilities (through 
defence industrial policy). As a possible alternative to this mixed poli-
cy strategy, it is possible to envisage two alternative “pure” scenarios: 
“INN” and “DEF”. The “INN” scenario (innovation policy) denotes 
the situation in which policy makers only pursue the international 
competitiveness objective by funding support to strengthen private 
companies’ product quality and export performance. The “MoD” sce-
nario (defence industrial policy), by contrast, represents the situation 
in which national authorities only focus on the military capability and 
national security objective by financing large multi-product enterpris-
es for developing new products of high military and strategic signifi-
cance. 
 
Secondly, the policy scenarios we set up differ in terms of the degree 
of openness and liberalization that characterizes the defence industry. 
The current situation, as described in section 2, is that the defence in-
dustry is typically a close and highly protected market. However, the 
new EU Directive that is now starting to be implemented by all Euro-
pean countries (including Norway) will in the future introduce a high-
er degree of openness and liberalization in this sector. Thus, the “EU” 
scenarios denote a future economic environment characterized by 
lower protection and greater market liberalization in the defence in-
dustry. 
 
In sum, combining together these two dimensions (national policy 
strategy and EU framework conditions) we outline the following six 
scenarios: 
 
1. Basic Mixed: protected market, mixed policy strategy 
2. Basic INN: protected market, only innovation policy 
3. Basic DEF: protected market, only defence industrial policy 
4. EU Mixed: liberalized market, mixed policy strategy 
5. EU INN: liberalized market, only innovation policy 
6. EU DEF: liberalized market, only defence industrial policy 
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Table 1 reports the values of the parameters that have been used to 
calibrate the model in these different scenarios. The “basic mixed” 
scenario is the baseline situation, and it has been set up by calibrating 
the model in order to fit the dynamics of an industry with an export 
propensity between 35 and 40%, which corresponds to the real per-
centage of exporting firms in the Norwegian defence market [
25
]. The 
three “EU” scenarios have been obtained by increasing two of the pa-
rameters vis-à-vis the baseline situation: (1) the product quality 
threshold (since market liberalization will induce firms to increase 
their expected profitability requirements to maintain their market posi-
tion); and (2) the competence breadth threshold (because national de-
fence authorities will inevitably become more restrictive when faced 
with a larger number of domestic and foreign applicants for public 
funding in the new EU regime in the future). On the other hand, the 
“INN” and “DEF” policy strategies have been set up by simply allow-
ing the existence of one criterion for public funding allocation (instead 
of two as in the “mixed” scenario). 
 
Table 1: Calibration of model parameters 
 
Parameter 
 
Definition  
domain 
Calibration value: 
Current regime 
Calibration value: 
EU liberalization regime 
 
Product quality  
threshold 
 
[0; 10] 6 8 
 
Competence breadth 
threshold 
 
[0; 10] 30 40 
 
Cooperation propensity 
 
[0; 0.50] 0.45 0.45 
 
Success threshold* 
 
[0; 12000] 5000 5000 
 
Number of firms 
 
> 0 300 300 
 
Number of products 
 
> 0 240 240 
 
Share of large firms 
 
> 0 5% 5% 
 
Share of end product 
firms 
 
> 0 35% 35% 
 
*The success threshold parameter is defined on a monetary metrics in thousands 
Norwegian Crowns (NOK). 
26 Martin Blom, Fulvio Castellacci and Arne Martin Fevolden 
5.2  Simulation results  
Figure 2 reports the results of the policy simulation analysis. Each 
panel of the figure focuses on one of the four industry-level outcome 
variables (i.e. our target or dependent variables). The first three varia-
bles (export propensity, total export value and mean product quality) 
are used as indicators of the industry’s international competitiveness, 
and hence they measure the effects of innovation policy support (see 
section 3). The fourth variable (competence breadth) does instead 
measure the overall pool of technological and military capabilities 
available in the industry, and it is thus used as an indicator of the ef-
fects of defence industrial policy. 
 
In each graph, we report the time path of a given variable for the six 
different scenarios outlined above and for a 150-run period. We have 
repeated each exercise for a total of 20 replications in order to make 
sure that our results are robust to the presence of stochastic shocks re-
lated to R&D activities and outcomes. Each point reported in the vari-
ous graphs in panel 6 is the average of these Monte Carlo replications.  
 
Before comparing the different policy scenarios that may be imple-
mented in the future, it is useful to focus on the current institutional 
set up – the “Basic mixed” scenario. Figure 2 shows its time path for 
the four industry-level outcome variables, thus illustrating the basic 
working of the model. The dynamics of the industry’s international 
competitiveness (as measured by its export propensity, total export 
value and mean product quality) is rather stable over time, whereas the 
industry’s mean competence level (measuring the achievement of de-
fence and military objectives) increases substantially over time. This 
means that in the current scenario, a protected market in which nation-
al authorities provide public support for achieving both competitive-
ness and defence objectives, the impacts on the latter is much stronger 
than on the former. The lack of a visible effect of innovation policy on 
international competitiveness is due, in our model, to the fact that in a 
closed and highly protected market the extent of competition, selec-
tion and learning effects, the major driving forces of industry dynam-
ics in our model, are limited. 
 
Would a different policy strategy be able to improve these outcomes? 
The two “pure” scenarios reported in figure 2 – the “basic INN” (in-
novation policy only) and “basic DEF” (defence industrial policy on-
ly) scenarios – suggest that this would indeed be the case. Both the 
“basic INN” and “basic DEF” experiments lead to a more dynamic 
path for the industry’s export propensity and total export value, thus 
ensuring a greater level of international competitiveness. As expected, 
however, these two differ substantially in terms of the impacts they 
have on the industry’s mean product quality and competence breadth 
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in the long run. A pure innovation policy strategy would increase sub-
stantially the market’s average product quality (and hence export per-
formance) but also lead to a significant reduction in the industry’s 
competence breadth. 
 
Further, figure 2 also shows that the implementation of the new EU 
Directive will introduce an important boost-effect in the model. Look-
ing at the three EU scenarios, in fact, we note that market liberaliza-
tion will increase the relative impact of innovation policy on the de-
fence industry’s export performance and international competitive-
ness. As noted above, the intuition behind this result is in line with 
recent models of firm heterogeneity and international trade: in an open 
and liberalized market, the competition, selection and learning effects 
that drive the aggregate dynamics of the industry are magnified, so 
that defence firms will on average become more innovative, more 
prone to inter-firm collaborations and knowledge sharing, and hence 
better suited to the requirements of international competition [
26
,
27
]. 
 
Figure 2: Six policy scenarios: Simulation results  
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Figure 3 provides a more explicit analysis of the trade-off between 
innovation and defence industrial policy. The figure plots these two 
dimensions and policy objectives against each other – i.e. it reports the 
values of the industry’s export performance (propensity and total ex-
port value) versus its competence breadth for our six scenarios at two 
specific time points of the simulation run, the medium term (t = 50) 
and the long term (t = 150). The purpose of this exercise is to provide 
an intuitive illustration of the trade-off and possible contrast between 
these policy objectives, and evaluate what the most efficient policy 
strategy is. The results for t = 50 and t = 150 are largely in line with 
each other. First, focusing on the three “basic” (or current) scenarios, 
we notice two main patterns.  
 
(1) The pure scenario “Basic DEF” (defence policy support only) is 
always superior (more Pareto efficient) than the “Basic mixed” strate-
gy: if national authorities decided to shift from the current mixed poli-
cy strategy to the pure DEF strategy, the industry’s competence 
breadth would remain at approximately the same level, but the export 
performance would increase substantially. In our model, this result is 
explained by the fact that defence companies, when they find it harder 
to receive public support to finance their innovation activities (e.g. 
because of the reduced innovation policy support), would be penalized 
in the short run but would, in the medium-longer term, gradually im-
prove their performance by setting up and managing their own pri-
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vately-funded R&D projects as well as exploiting external knowledge 
through inter-firm collaborations. 
 
(2) In the current regime, there is no clear and visible trade-off be-
tween the two pure strategies “Basic DEF” and “Basic INN”; by con-
trast, the former policy strategy seems to be always superior (more 
Pareto efficient) than the latter. In fact, the plots in figure 2 show that 
the shift from the “Basic INN” to the “Basic DEF” leads to a substan-
tial increase in the industry’s competence breadth (strengthening of 
military and defence capabilities) but only a small and negligible de-
cline in the export performance. 
 
Do the same results also hold for the three EU liberalization scenari-
os? Figure 2 indicates that this is arguably the case for the first pat-
tern: the “EU DEF” pure strategy leads to a better export performance, 
whereas the “EU mixed” scenario only brings a marginal increase in 
the competence breadth. The former (pure) strategy is therefore supe-
rior to the latter (mixed).  
 
However, the second pattern noted above is affected significantly by 
the EU liberalization process: in the long-run (t = 150), a visible trade-
off between the two pure strategies emerges. In fact, innovation policy 
support (“EU INN”) will eventually lead to a sizeable increase in the 
industry’s export performance, whereas defence policy support (“EU 
DEF”) would make it possible to strengthen the sector’s competence 
breadth substantially. In such a situation, the two policy objectives are 
clearly in contrast with each other, and the choice whether to focus on 
one or the other should be taken on purely political grounds. 
In short, our simulation analysis can be briefly summarized by the fol-
lowing propositions. 
 
Result 1: Pareto efficiency of pure vs. mixed policy strategies. A 
pure scenario in which national authorities focus on, and only provide 
support for, the achievement of defence and security objectives is al-
ways superior (more Pareto efficient) to the corresponding mixed 
strategy in which policy makers simultaneously pursue both defence 
and international competitiveness objectives.  
 
Result 2: The trade-off between pure policy strategies in the new 
EU liberalization regime. In the new EU liberalization regime, there 
will emerge a stronger and more visible trade-off between the two dif-
ferent policy objectives – national security and defence versus interna-
tional competitiveness – so that policy makers will have to set up a 
clear agenda focusing on only one of those objectives and neglecting 
the other. 
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Figure 3: The trade-off between different policy objectives: Ex-
port performance versus military capability building (competence 
breadth). A comparison of the six policy scenarios at t=50 and 
t=150. 
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6.Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper set out to investigate innovation and defence industrial pol-
icy in the context of a liberalizing market. It aimed to (i) investigate 
the trade-off and contrasting effects of two different policy objectives 
with regards to the domestic defence industry – strengthening military 
capabilities versus fostering international competitiveness – and to (ii) 
examine whether and to what extent a future liberalization of the Eu-
ropean defence market would affect this trade-off (as a consequence 
of the implementation of the new EU Directive). 
 
In terms of the trade-off between strengthening military capabilities 
and fostering international competitiveness, the simulation analysis 
found that there was a clear contrast between innovation and defence 
industrial policies, in the sense that pursing innovation policies would 
increase international competitiveness at the expense of military capa-
bilities and vice versa. Nevertheless, the loss of international competi-
tiveness was, in the basic scenario, fairly small compared to the gains 
in military capabilities (a few per cent loss in export propensity result-
ed in an almost 50% increase in competence breadth). This implies 
that if strengthening military capabilities is an important objective for 
the government, pursuing a “pure” defence industrial policy might be 
the best policy strategy. The simulation analysis also found that pursu-
ing both innovation and defence industrial policies simultaneously re-
sulted in a negligible improvement in military capabilities and a dra-
matic decline in international competitiveness, compared to pursuing 
defence industrial policies alone. This implies that a “mixed” strategy 
seems to be a poor strategy under all conceivable circumstances.  
 
In terms of the impact of a future liberalization of the European de-
fence market, the simulation analysis showed that the trade-off be-
tween innovation and defence industrial policy was not only main-
tained, but that it increased – in the sense that improving military ca-
pabilities came at a greater cost to international competitiveness. This 
implies that, in the future EU liberalization scenario, the government 
will have to reconsider its policy agenda and decide whether it is more 
important to focus on defence and security objectives (strengthening 
military capabilities of domestic companies) or to support the interna-
tional competitiveness of the industry. As the European market gets 
increasingly liberalized, the trade-off between the two will get strong-
er and the policy agenda will have to be adjusted accordingly. Similar-
ly to the basic scenario, the simulation analysis also found that pursu-
ing both innovation and defence industrial policies simultaneously re-
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sulted in a small improvement in military capabilities, but at the ex-
pense of a dramatic decline in international competitiveness. This im-
plies that a “mixed” strategy in a liberalized market will continue to be 
a less Pareto efficient policy strategy.  
 
Looking at the overall effects of the implementation of the new EU 
directive, our results indicate that it will strengthen the Norwegian de-
fence industry both in terms of international competitiveness and mili-
tary capabilities. International competitiveness will increase signifi-
cantly for all policy scenarios and military capabilities will be fostered 
slightly in two of the policy scenarios (innovation policy and mixed) 
and decline slightly in the last (defence industrial policy). This implies 
that for all policy scenarios considered in this paper (with the only ex-
ception of the ‘pure’ defence industrial policy strategy), the imple-
mentation of the EU directive will introduce in the Norwegian defence 
sector a higher degree of international competitiveness given the same 
level of domestic military capabilities. 
 
Although this article has investigated the trade-offs between different 
policy strategies in the defence sector, the insights gained through the 
analysis might be relevant for other sectors of the economy as well. 
We believe that the method used in this paper can be especially useful 
for analysing and forecasting developments in industries where there 
is a dynamic, complex and conflicting relationship between economi-
cally efficient production and important social externalities. Food pro-
duction could be one example, where some farming activities can con-
tribute to tourism and sustainable development by maintaining the cul-
tural landscape (preventing overgrowth and creating a “rural atmos-
phere”). Since the productivity and organization of these farming ac-
tivities can change over time, they need to be analysed in a framework 
that look at the trade-offs between their economic efficiency and posi-
tive externalities in a way that also takes into account the effects of 
technological change and varying market conditions. Other applica-
tions might be energy production, where some means of energy pro-
duction are less efficient, but more reliable or environmentally friend-
ly; or the pharmaceutical industry, where the development of some 
medications for tropical illnesses are less profitable, but might create a 
healthier and more peaceful world.   
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